By Catarina Demony and Michael Holden
LONDON (Reuters) – A public inquiry into the devastating 2017 London Grenfell Tower blaze concluded on Wednesday that a “culmination of decades of failure” by the government and the construction industry ultimately led to the disaster that killed 72 people.
It details how the government, council, architects, contractors, local council and management firms involved in refitting the exterior with flammable cladding – exterior panels designed to improve appearance and add insulation – bear much of the blame for what happened seven years ago.
THE GOVERNMENT
The report said the government, which at the time was led by former Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May, had “many opportunities” over the years to identify the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding and insulation in high-rise buildings, had ignored numerous warnings and failed to act.
In 2001, for instance, the government failed to pay due regard to the “striking results” of a large-scale test involving flammable cladding. It said the government department responsible for building regulation failed to ensure that the dangers it knew about were communicated to the industry.
Following a 2009 blaze at Lakanal House, another high-rise block in south London, the “government’s deregulatory agenda, enthusiastically supported by some junior ministers and the secretary of state, dominated the department’s thinking to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded”, the report said.
ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA (RBKC)
The wealthy Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), the local authority, failed to scrutinise the design or choice of materials and ensure that on completion of the refurbishment work the building complied with building requirements.
“It (RBKC) therefore bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous conditions of the building immediately on the completion of the work,” the report said.
The response by RBKC and the central government to the Grenfell fire and the needs of the victims was “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”, sometimes demonstrating a “marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity”.
“It left many of those immediately affected feeling abandoned by authorities and utterly helpless,” it said, adding for many the only source of support came from local voluntary organisations.
TENANT MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION
The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), the public body exercising control over the building, and RBKC were jointly responsible for the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower.
The report said TMO wanted to reduce the cost of the tower’s refurbishment by using ACM panels and must also bear responsibility for the disaster. It failed to take sufficient care in its choice of architect and paid insufficient attention to matters affecting fire safety.
THE FIRMS
A significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible insulation and aluminium composite materials (ACM) panels was the “systematic dishonesty” by an array of companies, the report said, adding some manipulated testing processes, misrepresented tested data and mislead the market.
The French subsidiary of the American company Arconic manufactured and sold the ACM cladding, and from 2005 until after the fire “deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger” of such cladding.
Celotex and Kingspan, which made the foam insulation, are also to blame, the report said.
In a bid to break into the insulation market for high-rise buildings, Celotex “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”.
Kingspan sold insulation that was not suitable for external use in high-rise buildings.
ARCHITECTS AND OTHER CONTRACTORS
None of those involved in the design of the external walls or the choice of materials, such as architectural firm Studio E, “acted in accordance with the standards of a reasonably competent person in their position”, the report said.
Studio E, responsible for the design of the external walls and the choice of materials, had wanted to use zinc rainscreen panels but the ACM version was chosen largely on cost grounds.
Construction contractor Rydon was able to offer a substantial saving due its relationship with the cladding sub-contractor Harley. The inquiry said all three took a casual approach to contractual relations.
Harley, the report said, did not concern itself sufficiently with fire safety at any stage of the refurbishment.
Studio E demonstrated a “cavalier attitude” to fire safety regulations and Rydon and Harley relied on their previous experience rather than on any technical analysis or expertise.
Fire safety inspectors Exova were instructed by Studio E, on behalf of the TMO, to prepare a fire safety strategy for Grenfell Tower but although a draft was prepared, it was never completed.
LONDON FIRE BRIGADE
After the fatal fire at Lakanal House, the London Fire Brigade (LFB) should have been “alerted” to the “shortcomings of its own ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings”, the report said.
It said LFB should have made better use of the knowledge it gained about the dangers posed by modern materials and methods of construction.
The LFB, the report said, was ill prepared to deal with Grenfell for several reasons, such as a “chronic lack of effective management and leadership” and the “unfounded assumption” that pre-existing building regulations were sufficient to ensure fires such as Grenfell would not occur in Britain.
OTHER BODIES NAMED IN REPORT
The Building Research Establishment played an important role in enabling Celotex and Kingspan to market their insulation products for use in the external walls of high-rise buildings, while the National House Building Council failed to ensure its building control function remained “free of commercial pressures”.
(Reporting by Catarina Demony and Michael Holden; Editing by Elizabeth Piper and Alexandra Hudson)
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